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I. Introduction
Traditionally, disputes between unions and employers over the terms
of employment have been settled by agreement through collective bargain-
ing. Failing such an agreement a strike, which imposes costs on both par-
ties, has been the weapon of last resort. The threat of such a strike
acts as an incentive for the parties to reach a bargained settlement.
More formally it creates a "contract zone" or a range of potential settle-
ments which both parties prefer to the strike outcome.
The recent increase in public sector unionization has sparked efforts
to devise procedures for settling labor disputes in this area without
resort to the strike. Binding third party intervention in the form of in-
terest arbitration is one alternative that has been utilized in a number of
jurisdictions. Interest arbitration is defined here as a procedure whereby,
failing a negotiated settlement, the parties abide by the decision of a
third party as to the terms of employment under dispute.
Two criteria have frequently been used to evaluate interest arbitra-
tion and other dispute settlement procedures. The first is the frequency
with which it is necessary to employ the procedure. For reasons which are
not entirely clear it is felt that a good procedure is one which is "seldom"
used and provides an incentive for the parties to reach a negotiated
settlement. As with the strike, the presence of an arbitration procedure
theoretically provides the parties with an incentive to reach a negotiated
settlement by creating a contract zone within which any settlement is pre-
ferred by both parties to arbitration. It is shown below that the ability
of an arbitration procedure to create such a contract zone depends on the
relative risk preferences of the parties.
The second criterion used to evaluate dispute settlement procedures
is the extent to which the presence of the procedure creates an environment
in which the bargained as well as the arbitrated settlements do not differ
significantly from the settlements that the parties would have reached
in an environment that did not include the procedure. The implication is
that a good procedure is one whose presence does not bias the outcomes.
It is demonstrated below that unbiasedness depends on the relative risk
preferences of the parties and, in addition, on their relative bargaining
powers
.
Section II contains the development of a model of bargaining in the
presence of a binding dispute settlement procedure. It is used to examine
the conditions under which the procedure encourages a negotiated settlement
by creating a contract zone.
There has been a feeling that interest arbitration of the type defined
earlier has failed to provide sufficient incentive for a negotiated settle-
2
ment. Final-offer arbitration has been suggested as a feasible alterna-
tive to simple arbitration, and a number of states have implemented final -
3
offer arbitration statutes for certain classes of government employees.
Section III contains a discussion of the impact of such a change in the
arbitration procedure on the incentive to reach a bargained settlement as
well as the position of any such settlement.
Finally, Section IV contains a summary of the results and the impli-
cations which may be drawn from the analysis concerning both the design and
the evaluation of dispute settlement procedures.
II. A Model of Bargaining in the Presence of a Binding Third Party Settle-
ment Procedure
Strikes create a contract zone of potential settlements which are
considered by both parties to be pareto superior to the strike outcome by
imposing the direct costs of foregone Income on both parties. Each party is
willing to sacrifice some potential gains from a strike in order to not bear
the costs of a strike. 4
Arbitration does not impose any direct costs on the parties.
Therefore, a contract zone must be created through a mechanism that is
fundamentally different from that of the strike. An implication of most
of the literature in this area is that the leverage of arbitration is
derived from the uncertainty perceived by the parties regarding the behavior
of the arbitrator. As a result the parties are willing to give up some
of the expected gains from an arbitrated settlement in order to avoid the
attendent uncertainty. It is our contention that this phenomena depends
crucially on the risk preferences of the parties.
The model which is constructed below makes a number of assumptions
concerning the bargaining process, the utility functions of the parties, and
the behavior of the arbitrator. These are all made in order to clarify
the exposition, and relaxation of these assumptions would not in any way
alter the nature of the conclusions.
First, it is assumed that there is a homogeneous "pie" of fixed size
and that the parties bargain over the division of the pie. Let the pie be
of size one so that the share of each party can be represented by a number
between zero and one. Let y represent the share of party a and z. = 1-y
represent the share of party b.
Second, let each party have a utility function
and
U
b
=U
b
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b ) (2)
Further, let U
fl
(0) = 0, U
b (0)
= 0, u"
a
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(l) = I.
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Assuming
positive marginal utilities, it is clear that the utilities of the parties
are in direct opposition to one another and that the gain of one party is
the loss of the other.
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Parameterizations of the utility functions which satisfy the above
constraints are
y c
1-e
a
and
l-e
ZbCb
l-e b
These are convenient functional forms because, regardless of the values of
c or c. , they always exhibit positive marginal utility and because the
G D
risk preferences of the parties are completely determined by c and c. .
Party a is risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving as c. 1s less than,
Q
equal to, or greater than zero. The analogous conditions determine the
risk preferences of party b.
Assume further that the arbitrator's role is to choose a y . which of
course determines z. . * 0-y
a
«) where y - represents the arbitrator's award
to party a. Neither party knows with certainty what the arbitrated settle-
ment will be. It is assumed that each party forms a prior distribution of
the arbitrator's decision and that these prior distributions are
"aA -
N<%- °a
2
> < 5 >
2bA -
N < zbF- °b
2
> < 6 >
where y F and z. F are the arbitration awards expected by each party should
the procedure be utilized. These may be determined by some notion of a
7 2 2
"fair" settlement, and they may or may not be equal. a and a. represent
o
the expected variances of the awards around y - and z. p.
Given these prior distributions each party calculates the expected
utility to them of using the arbitration procedure:
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where f(y
fl
; y
a p,
a ) and f(zb ; z.r, a. ) are normal probability density
functions defined in equations (5) and (6). Using the definition of a
moment generating function for a normal density these integrals have the
analytical solutions
,
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These expected utilities are combined with the utility functions in order to
solve for the certainty equivalent shares (yac and z. ) which are the y a and
z. that received with certainty would yield the same utilities as the ex-
pected utilities from arbitration.
l-e
a
and
l-e
b
Equating equations (9) and (11) and equations (10) and (12) and solving for
y
as
and ybs
vields
and
yas * yaF
+ \ °a\ < 13 >
z
bs
= zbF
+ \ %\ W
If the parties are risk averse (c a < 0, c. < 0) then yae < y- anda d as 3r
z. < z.p. Intuitively the parties would be willing to settle with cer-
tainty for less than the expected arbitration award. This sacrifice is
essentially a payment to avoid the disutility of the risk of arbitration.
Alternatively, if the parties are risk lovers (c, > 0, c. > 0) then y ae > yaC
a d as ar
and z. > z. c and the parties must be paid a premium in order to be discour-
aged from "enjoying" the risk of the arbitration process.
Assuming that the parties are expected utility maximizers, party a
would prefer to negotiate any settlement y a > y„ rather than resort toa as
arbitration while party b would prefer to negotiate any settlement z. > z.
rather than resort to arbitration. In order to determine if there 1s a zone
of potential agreement, note that if z. is the minimum share for b that will
cause b to prefer a negotiated settlement then l-z
b
= yb
is the maximum
share that b would be willing to give a and still prefer a negotiated settle-
ment. From equation (14)
ybs^-y^v-fVb (15)
or
ybs
=ybF-K2c b (16)
where y.r is party b's prior expectation of the arbitrators decision of a's
share.
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Thus, a will accept any negotiated settlement (y ) satisfying
y > y and b will accept any negotiated settlement satisfying y < y. .
Thus, the contract zone or range of potential settlements is
*- hs - *as = *bF ' *aF " ^°,\ + %\ ) ' {17)
If A is less than or equal to zero then there is no contract zone and the
9
arbitration procedure will be used. The question of where in any existing
contract zone the parties actually negotiate a settlement is discussed in
the next section.
It is clear from equation (17) that the contract zone will be larger
the larger is the difference between y.r. and y -. In other words, if the
parties have relatively pessimistic expectations about the arbitrator's
award then there may be room for a negotiated settlement. On the other
hand, if the parties have relatively optimistic expectations about the
behavior of the arbitrator then this will tend to discourage a negotiated
settlement by reducing the contract zone.
While there is no reason to assume that the parties' expectations
vary in any systematic fashion, it may be true that when a procedure is first
introduced the parties have differing and inaccurate expectations about the
arbitrator's behavior. If this difference is relatively pessimistic (optimis-
tic) then the procedure will be invoked less (more) frequently than it would
given accurate expectations.
This observation has important Implications for attempts to evaluate
the impact of any procedure or any change in procedure. To the extent that
the parties learn about the arbitrator's behavior and modify their expecta-
tions, the rate of utilization of a new procedure in the short run will not be
-8-
indicative of Its long run impact on the incentive to reach a bargained
settlement. Thus, an evaluation of a procedure after only one, two, or even
three years may be extremely misleading.
The long run impact of a procedure will depend primarily on the relative
risk preferences of the parties. In order to focus on this aspect of the
problem assume that the parties have Identical expectations about the arbi-
trator's behavior or that y&f
= ybfr and o* = a* = a
2
. Equation (17) can
be rewritten as
t =
-\ q2K + cb ] ' 08)
Recall that c < and c. < imply risk aversion on the part of a and b
respectively. If both parties are risk averse then c + c. < which implies
that A > 0, i.e. that there is a contract zone.
The weaker condition for the existence of a contract zone given iden-
tical expectations is that risk aversion dominate (c + c. < 0). It is not
necessary that both parties be risk averse but only that the party which is
most risk averse be in a sense more averse to risk than the extent to which
the other party loves risk.
In the simple world described above the parties have identical expec-
tations and, consequently, the utilization decision is completely determined
by the relative risk preferences. Although identical expectations mav be
rare, it is reasonable to conclude that the relative risk preferences of the
parties are an important determinant of the size of any contract zone and
that short run differences in expectations concerning the arbitrator's de-
cision serve to modify the potential contract zone implied by the relative
risk preferences of the parties.
It was demonstrated above that the relative risk preferences of the
parties are crucial to the ability of an arbitration procedure to create a
contract zone. For the procedure to be effective in the long run, risk
aversion must dominate. What are the risk preferences of unions and
management? There is almost a total absence of empirical evidence con-
cerning the risk preferences of the parties in a collective bargaining
situation. In the private sector, neoclassical economists generally assume
that firms are profit maximizers and hence risk neutral. On the other
hand, in a recent study of the preferences of union members as reflected in
the wage policy of the United Mine Workers a significant degree of risk
aversion was found. If these findings are representative then it seems
reasonable to assert that risk aversion dominates in the private sector.
In the public sector, which is the primary locus of interest arbitra-
tion procedures, there is no generally accepted objective function for the
employer. While not crucial to the earlier argument, some tentative notions
on the relative risk preferences of unions and employers in the public sector
can be developed. First, there is no reason, a priori
,
to expect that unions
in the public sector will exhibit risk preferences that are significantly
different from those of private sector unions. It is expected that unions
will be quite risk averse because they are dealing with the primary source
of income of their members, and the penalties for losing the members'
primary income source are liable to be severe.
Second and for similar reasons, the public sector employer is expected
to exhibit less risk aversion than the union. The reason for this is the
fact that wages, while important, are not the only expense of the
government unit and that the taxes which finance wages account for only a
small share of the expenses of the citizenry.
It is possible that the employer will be a risk lover if adverse arbitra-
tor rulings can be blamed on the "imposed" settlement while the employer
reaps the political benefits of favorable awards. It is not clear
-10-
that a union leader can use this device as effectively due to the impor-
tance of wage income to the union members.
In the context of the model developed earlier, it is reasonable to
.
assume that the union (party a) is risk averse (c a < 0) and that the publica
sector employer is less risk averse (c. > c ).. While it seems that the
usual situation will be one of risk aversion dominating (c + c. < 0), there
is no convincing evidence of this. Risk loving behavior by the employer
(or, however implausibly, by the union) may imply dominance of risk loving
behavior (c + c. > 0). This latter situation with identical expectations
a d
about arbitrator behavior implies no contract zone, and the result will be
complete reliance on the procedure by the parties or a total "chilling" of
bargaining.
III. The Implications of a Change in the Procedures
It was noted in the introduction that there has been some concern
that conventional arbitration has "chilled" bargaining and that the pro-
cedures are being overused. Final -offer arbitration was suggested as an
alternative to conventional arbitration that is ". . . well designed to . . .
generate(s) just the kind of uncertainty about the location of the arbitra-
tion award that is well calculated to . . . compel them (the parties) to
seek security in agreement." Thus, final -offer arbitration was conceived
as a technique for increasing the uncertainty about the arbitrator's
decision. While it is true that final-offer schemes are in some ways funda-
mentally different from conventional arbitration and that they may not actually
increase the uncertainty to the parties, it is useful to examine the impact
of such a change in procedures as essentially the result of an increase in
12
uncertainty. This allows us to examine its impact on both the frequency
of use of the procedure and the negotiated settlement itself.
-li-
lt is important to note that any change in the type of procedure
available may create temporarily divergent expectations which will have
an unpredictable effect on the contract zone. As the parties learn about
the new procedure this effect will disappear. Changes in the environment
may also cause expectations to diverge in the short run. Hence, during
unusual periods such as that which followed the New York City financial
crisis atypical rates of usage of arbitration procedures may occur.
Once the parties have identical expectations about the arbitrator's
behavior, equation (18) can be used to examine the impact of the change in
the procedure on the size of the contract zone ( & ) and hence the frequency
of use of the procedure. Taking the derivative of equation (18) with
2
respect to a yields
f2 -K + c b> < 19 >
which is greater than or less than zero as risk aversion or risk loving
behavior dominates. If the old procedure created a contract zone (risk
aversion dominated) then change to a riskier procedure will increase the
size of the contract zone making it less likely that fluctuations in the
parties' expectations will eliminate the zone and force use of the pro-
cedure. This is exactly the situation expected by the proponents of final -
offer arbitration. However, because it is not clear, a priori , whether
risk aversion or risk loving dominates it is also not clear whether a riskier
1
"3
procedure will cause the size of the contract zone to increase or decrease.
The other criterion, discussed in the introduction, for evaluating
the impact of a change in the arbitration procedure is the extent to which the
introduction of a new procedure changes the terms of the settlement both where
the procedure is used and where it is not used. In order to investigate this
problem we develop a naive bargaininq theory of the determination of the ne-
gotiated settlement.
12-
It is assumed that the relative bargaining powers of the parties
are such that a certain proportion (*) of the contract zone is always
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captured by party a. This is true regardless of the size or location
of the contract zone. Since the certainty equivalent share of party a
(y=.c) is tne lower bound of any positive contract zone, the actual nego-as
tiated settlement under the simple bargaining power model is
yn= yas
+ $ A (20)
where < * < 1. Of course, this only applies where t is greater than zero,
If £ Is less than zero then there 1s no contract zone and arbitration is
Invoked.
Maintaining the assumption of identical expectations about the
arbitrator's behavior and substituting from equations (13) and (18) into
equation (20) for yac and £ yieldsas
v yF + l°V *i o?<.v* cb ) (21)
or
y
n
=y
F
+ ^o2[(i-$)c
a
- «c
b ].
(22)
If party a has all of the bargaining power ($=1) then y = y*. - •* a c.
which is simply party b's certainty equivalent maximum share (yu
s
) f° r
party a. If party b has all of the bargaining power ($=0) then
1 2
y = y,. + 4j o c which is simply party a's certainty equivalent minimum
n r c. a
share (y ). In general $ will not take on either of these extreme values
as
but will lie somewhere between zero and one.
Even in cases where it is not used a change in the procedure can have
an effect on the location of the outcome in two ways. First, the new
-13-
procedure may bias or change the expected arbitration decision (y.-) in
the long run. It is clear from equation (21) that this bias will be
passed through on a one for one basis to the settlement.
It is of course true that the original arbitration procedure may
have biased the negotiated settlements relative to what they would have
been had no procedure been available. The question of biases from both
of these sources is strictly an empirical issue that should be investigated.
A second way in which a change in the type of procedure can affect
the location of the outcome is through a change in the uncertainty about the
2
arbitrators award (a ). Differentiation of y in equation (22) with respect
2
to a yields
3y ,
-£ JtO-Oc - #c b ]. (23)
3a
The sign of this expression is indeterminant and depends on the re-
lative risk preferences as well as the relative bargaining powers of the
parties. Given that risk aversion dominates ((c + c.) < 0, the necessary
and sufficient condition for an increase in uncertainty to increase y
•'n
( —£ > 0) is that
3a
#V'k,. (24)
a b
c.
While * measures the relative bargaining power of party a, — measures the
c
a
c
b
risk aversion of party a relative to the total risk aversion of the two
parties. Intuitively, equation (24) has the implication that the share
of party a will increase with an increase in the riskiness of the procedure
if the relative bargaining power of party a is high enough to offset
party a's risk aversion.
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this portion of the
analysis is that an increase in the uncertainty surrounding the arbitrator's
award will not bias the outcomes of negotiated settlements (-^ = 0) only if
3a
-14-
equation (24) holds with equality, i.e.
c
a
c
b
There is no reason why this should be true, and it will only be the merest
coincidence that it is in fact true. Thus, it can be concluded that in general
a change in the arbitration procedure which makes it more risky will bias the
outcomes of the negotiated settlements. The direction of the bias depends
on the relationship between the bargaining power of the parties and the
relative risk preferences of the parties.
The discussion in Section II suggested that there are reasons to
expect that the union is more risk averse than the public sector employer.
Assume for expository purposes that the union is "twice" as risk averse
as the employer and that party a is the union. In other words, c = 2c. < 0.
Substitution into equation (25) yields the result that the bargaining power
of the union must be such that it captures exactly two-thirds of the contract
zone ($=3-) in order that a change in the risk of the procedure not bias the out-
2 9yn
comes of negotiated settlements. If $ > = then —-9 > and the union will
16 8a
gain by a riskier procedure. Obviously, if the bargaining powers are
equal {$=j) then the union will lose because it is the more risk averse.
To summarize, the change to an arbitration procedure which involves more
uncertainty will increase the size of the contract zone as long as risk
aversion dominates. This implies a higher probability of achieving a
negotiated settlement. However, unless by chance the difference in risk
preferences between the parties is exactly offset by the relative bargaining
power of the most risk averse party the outcome of negotiated settlements
will be biased by the change in the procedure.
-15-
IV. Summary and Implications
In this study a model of the use of arbitration procedures and the
outcomes of negotiated settlements in the presence of arbitration pro-
cedures was developed. It was found that uncertainty about the arbitra-
tion award will create a range of potential negotiated settlements only
if risk aversion dominates the preferences of the parties.
The impact of alternative arbitration schemes which purport to
increase the uncertainty about the arbitration award (such as final -offer
arbitration) v/as also investigated. It was found that if risk aversion
dominates then increased risk will increase the size of the contract zone.
However, increased risk will almost always bias the outcomes of the nego-
tiated settlements in a way which depends on the relative bargaining powers
and risk preferences of the parties.
This study has important implications for both the design and eva-
luation of binding impasse procedures. First, the designers of any procedure
which attempts to create a contract zone through increased uncertainty should
consider the fact that such a procedure will almost always bias negotiated
outcomes. This is a difficult problem because of the absence of any norma-
tive guidelines about what constitutes a desirable outcome.
A second and obvious implication is that since increased uncertainty
is the important feature of a new procedure such as final -offer arbitration,
designers of such procedures should be sure that their proposed changes do
actually increase risk. It is not at all clear that this is the case with
18
final -offer arbitration.
Third, the crucial role of risk preferences on the effects of the
arbitration procedures strongly suggests that serious empirical investigation
-16-
of the relative risk preferences of the parties be undertaken. Along
this same line, empirical analyses of relative arbitrated outcomes
under the different systems would be useful because any differences
will spill over into the negotiated settlements.
Finally, note that because of initial differences in expectations
about the behavior of the arbitrators and because it may take time to learn
about the behavior of the arbitrators, studies which attempt to measure
the long run impact of changes in procedures shortly after they are insti-
tuted are bound to be misleading.
-17-
FOOTNOTES
States utilizing binding arbitration procedures in the public sector include
Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. U.S. Department of Labor (1976).
2
The so called "chilling" effect of arbitration is discussed by Feuille
(1975) and Wellington and Winter (1971).
3
In 1976 certain classes of public employees in Wisconsin; Michiqan; Massa-
chusetts; Eugene, Oregon; and Connecticut were covered by final-offer
arbitration statutes. U.S. Department of Labor (1976).
Final -offer arbitration is defined here as a procedure whereby the
arbitrator chooses one of the final -offers submitted by the parties without
any modification. See Stevens (1966).
Hicks argues that "... most strikes are doubtless the result of faulty
negotiation". Hicks (1963, p. 146). In other words the existence of a
contract zone should allow the parties to reach agreement without a strike
in most cases.
5
These assumptions involve linear transformation of an arbitrary utility
index. Under certain general conditions such a transformation does not
alter the risk behavior of the parties. See Luce and Raiffa (1957,
pp. 12-38).
6 "
U
a
Absolute risk aversion (ARA) of party a is defined as = -c . U and
U
a a
U. are undefined for c and c. equal to zero respectively, but by L 1 Hospi-
tal's rule lim U (y„) = y 3 which is a linear and hence a risk neutral utility
a a a
c -*0
a
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function. The analogous results hold for party b.
7
Equality is not yaF
= zbF>
but y
flF
= l-z
bfr
,
i.e. identical expectations.
g
The arbitrator's award must be constrained to the unit interval while the
normal distribution implies a. nonzero probability of an award outside the
2 2
unit interval. It is assumed here that a and a. are sufficiently small
so that the probabilities of an award outside the unit interval are very
small. If this is true then use of an unbounded distribution does not
seriously alter the results.
g
All problems of communication are abstracted from, and it is assumed that
if there is a contract zone than the parties find it.
10
See Farber (1977).
11 Stevens (1966, p. 46).
1 2
Two important differences are 1) that the parties themselves have control
over the final offers and hence the probabilities of their award being
chosen and 2) that there are only two discrete possibilities of an abri-
trator's award given the final offers. What these complications serve to
do is to make it more difficult to determine whether or not final -offer
arbitration actually increases uncertainty, but they do not otherwise alter
the qualitative implications of the model.
13
If risk loving dominates (c + c. > 0) then a riskier procedure will de-
crease the probability that fluctuations in expectations will create a
positive contract zone.
Relative bargaining power is a complex concept and it is a function of
many factors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it in any
detail. Relative bargaining power is in part a function of the relative
-19-
bargaining skills, financial positions, and public images of the parties.
See Chamberlain (1965, pp. 231-237).
See equation (16).
This may be a partial explanation for the evidence that employee groups
have sought legislation enacting final-offer arbitratdon procedures.
Stern (1974, p. 88). Even if unions are the more risk averse party, they
may have sufficient bargaining power to more than offset their risk
aversion.
If the parties have equal bargaining power then they must be equally risk
averse for a change in risk not to affect negotiated outcomes. The con-
verse is also true.
18
The parties may reduce risk in a final -offer scheme by adjusting their
final-offers to affect the probabilities of arbitration awards.
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